Introduction: In the age of digital public diplomacy, social media platforms have become key arenas for meaning-making, enemy representation, and the legitimation of military actions. Donald Trump, the former US president, during the military and media war between Iran and the United States in the Iranian calendar years 1404-1405 (2025-2026 CE), used Twitter (now X) as a platform to disseminate images related to Iran. These images went beyond mere news reporting; they conveyed implicit ideological meanings. Despite numerous studies examining the textual content of Trump’s tweets, systematic semiotic analysis of the images he posted—particularly during the peak of military tensions—remains a significant research gap. This research aimed to identify and analyze the semiotic systems employed in Donald Trump’s tweeted images about Iran during the 1404-1405 war period and to decode their implicit connotations, myths, and ideological functions.
Methods: This qualitative study adopted an integrated semiotic approach based on Roland Barthes’ theory (denotation, connotation, and myth) and Charles Sanders Peirce’s trichotomy (symbol, index, and icon). The research population consisted of all images posted by Trump’s official account (or his verified alternative accounts) during 1404-1405 that contained explicit or implicit references to Iran. A purposive, criterion-based sample of 27 images was selected based on the principle of theoretical saturation. Data were collected through systematic searches of Twitter/X and digital archives (e.g., the Wayback Machine) and stored along with their metadata. The analysis proceeded in four stages: (1) initial coding and description of visual signifiers; (2) analysis of connotations; (3) identification of myths; and (4) analysis of binary oppositions and ideological functions. MAXQDA software was used to assist with coding and categorization. Trustworthiness was enhanced through methodological triangulation (combining Barthes’ and Peirce’s approaches) and peer debriefing. Dependability was supported through an audit trail and a detailed codebook.
Findings: Classification of visual signifiers: Five main categories emerged: maps and borders (30%, e.g., manipulated maps of Iran featuring red arrows and the removal of Iranian islands), flags and national symbols (26%, e.g., Iranian and US flags presented in opposition and the Iranian flag depicted on sinking ships), military technologies (22%, e.g., aircraft carriers, submarines, drones, and missiles), leaders’ and commanders’ faces (15%, e.g., Trump and military commanders observing the scene), and abstract threat symbols (7%, e.g., storm clouds, fire, and the “red button”). Connotative meanings: Three dominant connotative themes were identified: (a) “existential, all-out threat”—conveyed through encircling red arrows on maps of Iran; (b) “annihilation and sinking”—represented through sinking Iranian fleets and falling drones, accompanied by captions such as “Dropping like butterflies”; and (c) “strategic ambiguity with temporal urgency”—reinforced by the recurring phrase “Time is of the essence” and imagery of storms. Myths: Three overarching myths were reproduced: (1) the “myth of defeated and passive Iran”—which systematically erases Iran’s military agency (e.g., by ignoring claims that Iran retained 70% of its missile arsenal); (2) the “myth of America as savior (military Christianity)”—in which Trump is presented as a noble commander protecting “civilization” from the “wild East”; and (3) the “myth of the ticking nuclear bomb”—which depicts Iran as an imminent existential threat, despite Iran’s longstanding claims that its nuclear program is peaceful. Binary oppositions: Six oppositions structured the visual discourse: Us/Them, Power/Weakness, Peace/War, Civilized/Barbaric, Future/Past (Trump vs. Obama/Biden), and Calm/Storm. These oppositions function to construct Iran as the “other” while associating Western audiences with Trump’s discourse. Ideological functions: The images served three main purposes: (a) legitimizing military action against Iran; (b) delegitimizing Trump’s domestic political rivals, particularly Obama and Biden; and (c) creating a psychological climate of threat and urgency intended to pressure Iranian decision-makers. Additional finding: A notable “absence” of positive Iranian signifiers (e.g., ordinary people, natural landscapes, scientific achievements, and cultural heritage sites such as Persepolis) was observed across all 27 images. This absence itself functions as a sign, indicating that Iran is reduced to a “security problem” and “military target” rather than represented as a living civilization.
Conclusion: Trump’s tweeted images during the 1404-1405 Iran-US war were not merely reflections of military events but functioned as powerful instruments in hybrid warfare and the broader battle over competing narratives. Through simple yet potent visual signs (maps, flags, storms, and sinking ships) and the reactivation of longstanding Orientalist myths, Trump and his media team contributed to constructing a visual discourse that could legitimize military violence against Iran. The systematic “absence” of positive representations of Iran suggests that this discourse sought the “semiotic erasure” of Iran as a living cultural identity. Theoretical contributions: This research offers an integrated Barthes-Peirce semiotic model for analyzing “crisis visual diplomacy.” It proposes the concept of “digital Orientalism”—the reproduction of Orientalist stereotypes through contemporary digital visual tools, including AI-generated images, infographics, and manipulated maps. The finding of a “zero sign” (the absence of positive Iranian signifiers) extends the application of semiotic theory to the analysis of visual discourse. Practical contributions: For Iranian media and cultural institutions, the study identifies the adversary’s visual patterns and suggests counter-strategies, including the production of alternative representations highlighting Iran’s defensive capabilities, scientific achievements, natural landscapes, and cultural heritage. For international relations and soft-power analysts, the proposed model provides a framework for decoding image-based psychological operations. For defense policymakers, understanding the myths reproduced by the adversary (e.g., the “ticking bomb” and “defeated Iran”) can contribute to the design of effective counter-narratives. In the era of visual diplomacy, military resistance and verbal diplomacy alone are insufficient. Iran needs a “semiotic corps” comprising graphic designers, filmmakers, media experts, and semioticians capable of producing powerful, credible, and constructive visual counter-narratives of Iran—not the mythologized image of Iran constructed by its adversaries. In this context, “meaning production”—the heart of contemporary soft power—can function as a strategic resource for responding to semiotic aggression.